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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

day statutory limitation was suspended. 9 Under this analysis, Equity's payments to Mutual fall within the redemption period. As
such, they must be included in the amount tendered by the Government to effect redemption under the proposed regulations." Therefore, Equity was entitled to reimbursement for the payments it made
during litigation under either approach.
The Treasury regulations proposed under §7425(d) were promulgated to solve the problems posed in Equity Mortgage Gorp. v.
Loftus." The regulations expressly include payments made during
the redemption period in the amount to be tendered but exclude such
payments from "expenses necessarily incurred" under §2410(d)(3).1
Pre-foreclosure payments generally are not included unless they
give rise to an interest includable in the debt legally satisfied by the
foreclosure sale. 3 With respect to post-redemption payments in an
Equity Mortgage situation where redemption is incomplete, the
payor would be entitled to full reimbursement under principles of
equity or limitations of actions." Thus, with the exception of the preforeclosure payments, the proposed regulations would achieve the
same result as that reached by the Fourth Circuit. Although the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Equity Mortgage will be replaced by the
proposed Treasury regulations, the court's use of equitable principles
provides a basis for interpreting new fact situations arising with respect to the Government's exercise of its right of redemption under
Internal Revenue Code §7425(d) and 28 U.S.C. §2410(d).
SAMUEL

XI.
A.

J. WEBSTER

TAXATION

Taxability of Special Death Benefits

Special benefits paid by employers to the estates or beneficiaries
of deceased employees raise questions concerning both the deducti, Cf. Brunswick Land Corp. v. Perkinson, 153 Va. 603, 151 S.E. 138 (1930).
Proposed Treas. Reg. §301.7425-1(b)(1)(iv).
Compare Temp. Treas. Reg. §400.5-1(c)(2), note 24 supra, promulgated before
Equity Mortgage, with Proposed Treas. Reg. §301.7425-4(b)(1), promulgated following
the Fourth Circuit's decision, which includes a separate sub-section, §301.74254(b)(1)(iv), for payments made to a senior lienholder.
11Proposed Treas. Reg. §§301.7425-4(b)(1)(iv), -4(b)(4). See text accompanying
notes 32-39 supra.
13 Proposed Treas. Reg. §§301.7425-4(b)(2)(ii); 301.6323(e)-l(a)(6), -1(d);
301.6323(i)-1(b). See text accompanying notes 40-54 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
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bility of payments made by the employer' and the taxability of payments received by the beneficiaries.2 In PearsonU. United States,3 the
Fourth Circuit considered the taxability of payments received by an
employee's widow under a unique death benefit program provided by
the Graybar Electric Company.4 After the death of the taxpayer's
husband, Graybar exercised its right of redemption on the Graybar
stock held by the decedent at the time of his death. Following the
redemption, the taxpayer received payments under a death benefit
plan for beneficiaries of stockholders.' The Fourth Circuit held7 that
these payments, which bore a close relationship to the employer's
' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (1). The section grants a business deduction for
salaries or other forms of compensation paid for actual performance of services.
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(1). The section defines gross income to include

all compensation for services rendered. Internal Revenue Code § 102(a) excludes the
value of property acquired by gift from gross income. The Treasury Department ruled
that it will regard nearly all employer payments to widows as a form of taxable compensation and not as tax free gifts. Rev. Rul. 102, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 37, modifying Rev.
Rul. 326, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 32.
The first $5,000 of death benefits paid by an employer to the beneficiary or estate
of an employer is excluded from gross income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b)(2)(A).
If death benefits qualify as gifts, however, they are not limited to the $5,000 exclusion
of § 101(b)(2)(A). Such death benefits are excluded from gross income by § 102(a).
Rev. Rul. 102, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 37, modifying Rev. Rul. 326, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 32.
See generally Comment, Voluntary Payments to Widows of CorporateExecutives:
Gifts or Income?, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1216 (1964); Note, Payments to Widows of Corporate Executives and Employees-Gifts or Income?, 49 VA. L. REV. 74 (1963).
3519 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1975).
1 Graybar's stock is owned entirely by company employees. The stock is subject
to a power of redemption upon an employee's death, which Graybar has exercised
consistently. Following redemption, the Graybar board is authorized to make payments for the next five years which do not exceed the dividends paid during that period
on the amount of stock repurchased. Jensen v. United States, 511 F.2d 265, 268 & n.3
(5th Cir. 1975). The special death benefit plan provides that Graybar is not obligated
to make these payments. Id. at 268 n.4. In practice, however, the company almost
always pays. Id. at 268.
The tax consequences of this plan for the employer, Graybar, were contested in
Graybar Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 403 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 822 (1959). The Second Circuit accepted the Commissioner's argument that the payments were made as part of stock purchases from the estates of
deceased stockholders and thus were not deductible by Graybar as compensation
under Internal Revenue Code § 162(a)(1). 267 F.2d at 404.
See note 4 supra.
These special death benefits are made in addition to a regular death benefit
piogram available to all employees and their beneficiaries. Regular death benefits are
subject to the $5,000 tax free limitation of Internal Revenue Code § 101(b). See note 2
supra.
1 519 F.2d at 1280.
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stock distribution plan,' were not gifts and were therefore taxable.,
The taxpayer contended that a test adopted by the Fourth Circuit
in Poyner v. Commissioner'" should be applied in Pearson. The
Poyner test had been applied on identical facts in a Ninth Circuit
decision" which held that the payments were gifts and therefore excludable from gross income.' 2 The Poyner court mentioned four distinct points as being indicative, but not conclusive, of a gift.1 3 First,
the payments must be made to the beneficiary of a deceased employee rather than to the estate. Second, the corporation can derive
no benefit from the payments. Third, the decedent's spouse cannot
have performed any services for the corporation. Fourth, the services
of the employee must already have been fully compensated.
Conceding that the Poyner factors appeared to be satisfied in
Pearson,the Government nevertheless contended that the payments
should be treated as capital gains.' 4 To support this contention, the
Commissioner argued that the payments were additional consideration for the redemption of stock previously owned by the beneficiary's
See note 4 supra.
The Fourth Circuit in Pearson did not reach the issue of how the payments
should be taxed. Taxpayer originally reported the payments as capital gains, INT.REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1201, and subsequently filed for a refund in this action, INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 7422. Since the Fourth Circuit ruled that taxpayer was not entitled to a
refund, there was no need to discuss how the payments should be taxed. However, the
court noted that alternative treatments include distribution of corporate profits, INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301, or inclusion in gross income, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61.
519 F.2d at 1280 n.3.
10301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962). The Poyner test actually listed five factors, but
two of the five were indistinguishable. The fifth factor, identical with the fourth factor
listed in the text, required that there be no obligation on the transferor to pay additional compensation to the deceased employee. Id. at 291. The Fourth Circuit in
Poyner cited the test to Florence S. Luntz, 29 T.C. 647, 650 (1958), which also listed
five factors. The test was formulated, however, in Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24
T.C. 916 (1955), which acknowledged the redundancy of the fifth factor. Id. at 920.
Later courts have continued to use the five factor variation of the original Hellstrom
test, as listed in Florence S. Luntz. See, e.g., Jensen v. United States, 511 F.2d 265,
270 (5th Cir. 1975); Harper v. United States, 454 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1971). The
test incorporated the factors considered important in gift determination prior to Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). See note 20 infra. After Duberstein, the
Fourth Circuit adopted the five factors in Poyner but indicated that the test was not
complete or intended to be conclusive. 301 F.2d at 292.
11Harper v. United States, 454 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1971). The Harperdecision was
based totally on satisfaction of the five point test, which was also advocated by the
taxpayer in Pearson. See note 10 supra.

1954, § 102(a).

"

INT. REV.

'

301 F.2d at 291. See note 10 supra.
Pearson v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9406, 84,003 (E.D. Va. 1974).

"

CODE OF

622

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII

husband. 5 The Commissioner further asserted that Graybar was
under a moral or legal duty to make the payments."6 This duty was
an additional factor which the Commissioner contended outweighed
the Poyner test. 7 According to the government, this moral duty to
pay employees' beneficiaries in the future arose from the consistency
with which Graybar made these payments over prior years. 8
The district court in Pearson started its analysis with
Commissioner v. Duberstein,11the leading Supreme Court gift determination decision. Duberstein held that the transferor's motive is the
controlling consideration and that it must be ascertained by objective
analysis of all the relevant facts." Accordingly, the district court in
Pearson sought to determine the motivation for the payments to the
taxpayer. The court examined not only the four points stressed by the
taxpayer but looked for evidence which might support the Commissioner's contention that a duty to make the payments existed. However, the court found no facts indicating the existence of such a
duty.' Thus, although their Dubersteinanalysis did not consider the
Poyner factors to be a definitive statement, the district court concluded that the payments were gifts. 2 The Fourth Circuit reversed
and held that the taxpayer was not entitled to a refund for taxes paid
on the benefits.
In reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit wholly adopted
the rationale of the recent decision in Jensen v. United States, 3 a
See note 4 supra.
" The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), see
note 20 infra, set forth its previously established general principles on gift determination. Referring to its decision in Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937), the
Court in Dubersteinreiterated that payments proceeding from "'the constraining force
of any moral or legal duty' " are not gifts. 363 U.S. at 285. The Commissioner phrased
his argument in the above terminology. Pearson v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9406, 84,003 (E.D. Va. 1974).
,7 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9406 at 84,003.
"9 Id. See note 28 infra.
19363 U.S. 278 (1960).
20 Id. at 286. The Duberstein Court refused to set an absolute standard for determination of the dominant reason for a transferor's action. Id. at 286-88. Instead, the
Court reviewed general principles expressed in previous opinions. For example, a gift
proceeds from generosity, Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956), or from
affection or charity, Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1952). In contrast, payments made because of a moral or legal duty, or in anticipation of economic
benefit, are not gifts. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
S1 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9406 at 84,003.
15

22

Id.

- 511 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1975). Jensen was decided the day after the arguments
in Pearson.Thus, the circuit conflict between Jensen and Harper,see text accompanying note 11 supra, was not known at the time.
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Fifth Circuit case with nearly identical facts." The Jensen court, like
the district court in Pearson,began its analysis with Duberstein,and
acknowledged the need to resolve the gift issue by a close inspection
of the facts. While noting the relevance of the Poyner test,2" the
court stated that Dubersteinclearly called for a broader examination
of the facts. Specifically, the court noted"7 that the Poyner test failed
to account for the continuing nature of the payments. 8 The Fifth
Circuit agreed with the Commissioner that this history of payments
was a crucial fact. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit had previously indicated
that the existence of a payment plan is very persuasive against a
finding that a payment was a gift, particularly where the operation
of the plan resulted in a benefit to the transferorY'
When the Graybar plan was subjected to close scrutiny, the
Jensen court found that a benefit to the employer did, in fact, exist.2 '
In determining whether to provide death benefits, Graybar never
considered the needs of the individual beneficiaries.22 Instead, payments seemed to follow automatically when the deceased employee
had owned stock. 3 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the high percentage of cases in which payments had been made created an expectation among employees that such payments would continue to be
made. Thus, the trend served as an inducement for continued employee participation in the stock purchase plan which, in turn, generated working capital for the company. 4 Since a benefit to the transferor was a factor indicating that a payment was a gift under Poyner,
that test no longer supported the taxpayer's position.
24 The only factual difference between Pearsonand Jensen was that the payments
in Jensen were made directly to the estate rather than to the beneficiary. 511 F.2d at
270. The Fifth Circuit indicated, however, that this factor, one of the original
Hellstrom points, was not significant in their decision. Id. at 270.
2 Id. at 269.
21 Id. at 270.
27

Id.

21Between 1941 and 1957, the additional payments were made in 189 of 193
redemptions. For the years 1960-1972, they were made in 271 of 273 redemptions. The
instances in which payments were not made involved beneficiaries remotely related to
the stockholding employee from whom the stock was redeemed. Id. at 268. Possibly
these parties did not even qualify to take under the specific provision of the Graybar
plan which required that potential beneficiaries of the special death benefits be qualified to receive regular death benefits. Id. at 268 n.5.
2

Id. at 270.

20Tomlinson v. Hine, 329 F.2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1964).
-, 511 F.2d at 271.
22 Id.

3 See note 28 supra.
34511 F.2d at 271.
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After finding this benefit to Graybar, the Fifth Circuit established
a second ground for their decision. The circuit court concluded, as the
government had originally argued,35 that a moral obligation to make
the payments existed as long as the plan remained in effect.' 6 Like
the benefit to the employer, this obligation arose from the regular
practice of making payments and the resulting expectation of continued payments among the employees. The court determined that it
would be unconscionable to deny payments to any one beneficiary
when virtually all similarly situated employees had received payments in the past.3 7 Thus, as the taxpayer had failed to prove that
the payments were entitled to exclusion," the Fifth Circuit held that
they were taxable.
In completely adopting the Jensen reasoning, the Fourth Circuit
failed to establish a rigid standard which would clarify the distinctions between gifts and income. However, a basic principle reiterated
by the Supreme Court in Duberstein was applied in addition to the
factors previously employed by the Fourth Circuit in Poyner. Proceeding under a Dubersteinanalysis, the discovery of a moral obligation on the transferor to make payments will be a strong indication
that payments are not gifts. Together with the Poyner factors, the
adoption of the moral obligation criterion establishes a more comprehensive basic test for use in the Fourth Circuit. Ultimately, however,
the recipient of death benefits who seeks to exclude those payments
from gross income as gifts must prove the contention on the basis of
all the facts, rather than relying upon a mechanical application of
prior standards which support the finding of a gift.
B. The Fourth Circuit Denies Rental Deductions Under a Clifford Trust Leaseback
In Perry v. United States,' the Fourth Circuit refused to permit a
deduction under Internal Revenue Code § 162(a)(3)2 for rental pay-

"

See text accompanying note 16 supra.
511 F.2d at 272.

37 Id.

-' The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that a payment is entitled to exclusion. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1976).
ITNT. REV.

CODE OF

1954, § 162(a)(3). This section allows a deduction for all

ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a business, including
required rental payments. The Treasury Department's policy on deductibility of rental
payments to a trust under a leaseback arrangement is stated in Rev. Rul. 9, 1954-1
CUM. BULL. 20, modified, Rev. Rul. 315, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 624. These rulings state
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ments on property held in a Clifford trust.3 The taxpayers4 in Perry
had transferred property used in the husband's business to a valid
trust5 for the benefit of their children. Although the trust was irrevocable for a period of ten years and one day, the property was to revert
to the grantor following the expiration of the trust. Upon creation of
the trust, pursuant to a previous arrangement, the independent trustee immediately leased the property back to the taxpayer's medical
partnership at a fixed monthly rate for the duration of the trust. In
Perry, the court had to decide which of two existing tests should be
applied in deciding the deductibility of rental payments made to the
trust by the settlor-lessee. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the
creation of the trust and leaseback should be considered as a single
transaction.' Viewing the trustee's powers as illusory, the court held
that such payments could not be deducted because there was no valid
business purpose for the transaction.'
Schemes involving a gift to a trust and a subsequent leaseback by
the donor have been a popular income shifting device for many years.'
The Internal Revenue Code establishes standards for determining the
validity of such a short term trust' but provides no guidelines for
that rental payments made to the trust by the grantor will not constitute deductible
business expenses. However, the 1957 ruling notes that the rental payments will constitute a completed gift for federal gift tax purposes.
The name "Clifford trust" is derived from Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331
(1940), in which the Court held that the settlor of a short term trust, although his wife
was the beneficiary, was owner of the trust property for tax purposes. Hence, the term
"Clifford trust" has been used to describe any short term intra-family trust. Oliver,
Income Tax Aspects of Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property in Trust, 51 CORNELL
L.Q. 21, 24 (1965).
The taxpayers in Perry and the companion case, Medders v. United States, 520
F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), operated a medical clinic as a partnership in the building
which they owned as tenants in common. Each taxpayer conveyed his interest in the
building to a trust with his child as beneficiary. The partnership then leased the
building back from the two trusts in separate lease agreements. The only factual
distinction between the two cases is that the term of the Medders trust was slightly
longer; the issues presented were identical. 520 F.2d at 237.
5 Both parties agreed that the trust met the requirements for a Clifford trust under
Internal Revenue Code §§ 671-78. 520 F.2d at 237. See note 9 infra.
520 F.2d at 238.
SId.
A The trust-leaseback device shifts income producing property from the high tax
bracket of the grantor to the lower tax bracket of the beneficiary, usually the grantor's
wife or child. See generally Note, Use of a Trust and Lease-back As A Tax Avoidance
Device, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 247 (1951); Note, The Gift and Leaseback: A New Tax
Avoidance Gimmick, 59 YALE L.J. 1529 (1950).
9 In 1954, Congress promulgated standards for determination of the validity, for
taxation purposes, of a Clifford trust. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § § 671-78. Under § 673
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deciding if rental payments made under a leaseback arrangement by
the settlor are deductible. 0 Both the regulations" and a congressional
report 2 state that the standards for determining the validity of a
short term trust 3 do not apply for deciding deductibility of rental
payments made to the trust. Since the Internal Revenue Code fails
to provide adequate guidelines, the courts have had to develop their
own standards.
The courts have established two basic tests to determine the deductibility of rental payments made to a Clifford trust following a
leaseback to the settlor.14 First, some courts, analyzing the gift to the
trust and the leaseback as a single transaction, require that a valid
business purpose be shown for the whole arrangement." Second,
other courts view the creation of the trust and the leaseback as separate transactions. 6 Under the second test, the first step is to evaluate
the grantor shall be treated as the owner of the trust if he has a reversionary interest
which may reasonably be expected to take effect within ten years from the date of the
transfer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673. There are also restrictions on the grantor's
retention of administrative powers, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 675, the power to revoke
the trust, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 676, and the power to control beneficial enjoyment,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 674. See generally Froehlich, Clifford Trusts: Use of Partnership Interests as Corpus; Leaseback Arrangements, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 956 (1964).
"0 Rental payments would be deductible, if at all, under § 162(a)(3). INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(3).
11Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(c)(1971) states in pertinent part: "these sections have no
application in determining the right of a grantor to deductions for payments to a trust
under a transfer and leaseback arrangement."
12 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1954). The report states in pertinent
part: Sections 671-78 "also [have] no application in determining the right of a grantor
to deductions for payments to a trust under a transfer and leaseback arrangement."
'3 See note 9 supra.
For comprehensive discussion of the trust and leaseback cases see Oliver,
Income Tax Aspects of Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property in Trust, 51 CORNELL
L.Q. 21 (1965); Note, Tax Consequences of an Intrafamily Transfer of Business Property into Trust for Dependents with a Leaseback by the Grantor'sBusiness, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1420 (1973); Note, Gift and Leaseback-Tax Planning in the Shadows of
Assignment of Income and Business Purpose, 62 GEO. L.J. 209 (1973).
"1 All courts applying the single transaction test have denied the deduction for
rental payments. See Wiles v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g mem.
59 T.C. 289 (1972) (taxpayer named himself trustee and commingled business and
personal expenses); Chace v. United States, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam),
aff'g 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (taxpayer retained control of trust property
by right to renew lease for remainder of trust); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d
440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965) (see text accompanying notes 20-22
infra); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952) (taxpayer transferred his entire interest in a patent to his wife but retained
administrative control).
" Courts applying the two-step test have generally allowed a deduction. See, e.g.,
C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
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whether the grantor has sufficiently divested himself of the ability to
control the property committed to the trust. If the first step is satisfied, the second step is to determine if a business purpose exists for
the leaseback itself. Thus, the basic difference between the two tests
is whether the gift to the trust and the leaseback should be analyzed
as separate events or as a single transaction. The question is essentially one of fact, and courts have continually looked at factors such
as the nature and power of the trustee," the terms of the lease,' 8 and
the retained interest of the taxpayer."
In Perry, the Commissioner argued that the entire transaction was
merely a device to shelter income and therefore should be disregarded
for purposes of taxation. 0 The Government relied primarily on the
Fifth Circuit case of Van Zandt v. Commissioner"'in which, unlike
Perry, the settlor-taxpayer also acted as the trustee. The Fifth Circuit
viewed the creation of the trust and the leaseback as a single transaction lacking a valid business purpose and concluded that rent paid
under the leaseback was not an ordinary and necessary business expense deductible under § 162(a)(3).3 Thus, the Commissioner urged
17Id.

1 See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972) (deduction
allowed where amount of rent was reasonable); Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d
69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955) (deduction disallowed where amount
paid in rent was grossly in excess of fair rental value).
11Internal Revenue Code § 162(a)(3) specifically excludes deductions for rental
payments where the taxpayer-settlor has retained an equity interest. Three cases denying a deduction for rental payments have mentioned this factor as at least one of
several pertinent factors. See Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla.
1969), af'd, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584
(N.D.N.Y. 1962); Gibbons v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9365 (D.N.M. 1970).
Two other cases prior to Perry have held for the taxpayer on the issue of whether
the retained interest constituted a disqualifying equity. See, e.g., Duffy v. United
States, 343 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd on othergrounds, 487 F.2d 282 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973). See
also Comment, Gift and Leaseback: PlanningPerspectives in an Unlegislated Field,
63 Ky. L.J. 205, 226 (1975).
20 Perry v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 15, 19 (E.D.N.C. 1974). The alternative
argument raised by the Commissioner for denial of the deduction was that the taxpayer's reversionary interest constituted an equity forbidden by Internal Revenue Code
§ 162. This argument was rejected by the district count, 376 F. Supp. at 19, and was
not discussed by the Fourth Circuit.
21 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
1 INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(3). The concept of a business purpose test
originated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The Court ruled in Gregory
that although a taxpayer may minimize his taxes by all available means, a transaction
giving rise to a business deduction must have a valid business purpose. Id. at 469. In
applying this test, the Van Zandt court stated that factors such as the short term of a
trust, reversion to the settlors, and a predetermination of the right to possession of the
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the use of the first test, requiring a valid business purpose for the
entire transaction.
The taxpayer in Perry relied on Skemp v. Commissioner3 in
which the Seventh Circuit allowed a rental deduction on facts similar
to Perry. The Skemp court adopted the two-step test.2 4 After first
observing that the settlor of the trust had surrendered control of the
trust property to an independent trustee, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the leaseback as a separate step. Thus, the fact that the taxpayer had voluntarily transferred his business property to the trust
was not important. The Skemp court only required a business purpose to be shown for the leaseback. Since the taxpayer still needed
control of the trust property in order to continue in business, the rent
paid under the leaseback was held deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. 21
The Fourth Circuit chose to follow the reasoning in Van Zandt,
adopting the single transaction test. 2 In evaluating whether there
was a valid business purpose, the Fourth Circuit paid particular attention to the function of the trustee. 27 Under the trust instrument,
the trustee purportedly was granted broad powers to collect and
property bear heavily on the element of business purpose. 341 F.2d at 444. For comprehensive discussion of the business purpose test, see Gibbs, Income Shifting-Recent
Trends in Leaseback Transactions, 19 Sw. L.J. 273 (1965). Internal Revenue Code §
162 itself requires that the payment must be both ordinary and necessary in order to
be deductible. See note 2 supra.
168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). The significant differences in Skemp were that the
grantor did not retain a reversionary interest, the irrevocable period of the trust was
longer, and the property granted to the trust was only partially leased back. See text
accompanying notes 4 and 5 supra.
21 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
5 Irr. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A). This section was the predecessor of
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 162(a)(3). It also required that a business expense
be ordinary and necessary in order to be deductible.
26 In cases involving different tax problems, the Fourth Circuit has looked to the
overall effect of multistep transactions. See DeTreville v. United States, 445 F.2d 1306
(4th Cir. 1971); J. M. Turner & Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 370 (4th Cir. 1957);
Starr v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 964 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 680 (1936).
2 The Fourth Circuit in Perry did not clearly articulate its purpose in examining
the nature of the trustee's powers. Although the examination may have contributed
to the court's decision to use the single transaction test, its main thrust seems to have
been toward evaluation of business purpose. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the court, having already made the decision to use the single transaction test,
went to great lengths to distinguish Skemp on the facts. The Fourth Circuit indicated
that regardless of which test was used, the active nature of the trustee in Skemp
indicated a business purpose, and the same result would be reached. 520 F.2d at 239.
2 The full text of the trust agreement is printed in Perry v. United States, 376 F.
Supp. 15, 17 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
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disburse the income of the trust for the beneficiaries. The Fourth
Circuit found that the trustee in Perry actually served no function
other than to hold title and receive and disburse the rental payments.2 Prior to the creation of the trust, the trustee had arranged
the terms of the lease. However, since the lease committed all trust
property back to the control of the settlor for the duration of the trust,
the trustee was unable to exercise any management powers which
might have been granted to him by the trust agreement. Because the
trustee was denied the opportunity to manage actively the trust property, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the independence of the trustee was illusory and that no business purpose was served by the
transaction. 0 Since the taxpayer created the situation himself, the
court refused to consider the rental payments as a necessary business
expense under § 162(a)(3). 31
Although the Fourth Circuit in Perry ultimately concluded that
the trustee's powers were illusory, the court seemed to imply that a
business purpose might be found where the trustee had a significant
function to serve in managing the trust.2 In attempting to illustrate
that identical results could be reached regardless of which test was
employed, the Fourth Circuit partially distinguished two cases based
on the more active role of the trustee.3 To create such an active role
for the trustee, tax planners in the Fourth Circuit might transfer more
property to the trust than is required for the leaseback.3 4 While a
portion of the trust property is leased back to the settlor, the residue
can be managed by the trustee. For example, if an office building is
transferred to a trust and the taxpayer only needs to lease part of the
space for his own business, the trustee could supervise the rental of
the remaining office space. An alternative method to increase the
active management of the trustee may be to negotiate the leaseback
520 F.2d at 238.
30 Id.
3' INT.

Rsv. CODE OF
32 520 F.2d at 238.

1954, § 162(a)(3).

13See notes 34 and 35 infra. The Fourth Circuit in Perry further distinguished
Skemp, and Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
814 (1950), by.noting that the taxpayer in those cases had not retained a reversionary
interest in the trust property 520 F.2d at 239.
34 The fact that more property is given to the trust than is leased back does not
guarantee that the ensuing rental payments will be deductible. See Wiles v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g mem. 59 T.C. 289 (1972). The Fourth
Circuit, however, carefully explained that the same decision in Skemp could be
reached when a single transaction test was applied, partially because more property
was granted to the trust than was leased back. 520 F.2d at 239. See also 6 P-H 1975
FED. TAxEs 60,483.
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for a period shorter than the duration of the trust.35 Once the lease
expired, the trustee would be responsible for management of the trust
property for the remainder of the trust term. Similarly, the trustee
would then be responsible for finding a lessee for the duration of the
trust. Either recourse would give the settlor-taxpayer a stronger argument that a business purpose exists because of the trustee's active
role in managing the trust.
The adoption of the single transaction test by the Fourth Circuit
in Perry sets a stringent standard for determining the deductibility
of rental payments made to a Clifford trust following a leaseback to
the settlor. Although the deduction was denied in Perry, the court
indicated that an active independent trustee would help establish a
valid business purpose. However, no court applying the business purpose test to the overall transaction has allowed the deductions, and
the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Perry has seriously affected the use of
the gift and leaseback transaction as a tax-saving tool.
C. The Fourth Circuit Takes a New Stance on Net Operating
Loss Carryback
The Fourth Circuit recently departed from all prior precedent
over the treatment to be given net operating loss deductions' carried
back to years in which a corporation used the alternative tax computation for capital gains. 2 In Mutual Assurance Society v.
Commissioner' the court paid exacting attention to the literal meaning of Internal Revenue Code § 1721 and held that a taxpayer must
take his entire taxable income into account in determining any excess
loss carryback available for future years following the initial application of the loss carryback to the earliest year designated by § 172. The
resulting conflict between the Fourth Circuit and other circuit courts5
I The Fourth Circuit distinguished Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950), partially on the basis that the leaseback was
not for the duration of the trust. 520 F.2d at 239.
INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 172.

1954, § 1201(a).
505 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1974).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 1003 (1975); Olympic Foundry Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.
1974); Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 346 (1969), aff'd 428 F.2d
474 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam). Arguments in Fosterwere heard by the Supreme Court
on November 12, 1975 but at the time of this writing no decision has been announced.
44 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (No. 74-799).
2

INT. REV. CODE OF
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has brought about the need for Supreme Court resolution of the problem presented in Mutual Assurance.6
The operating loss carryback provision7 was promulgated to
equalize tax treatment between corporations experiencing periodic
income and corporations generating. income at a steady rate.' If, in
any particular year, a taxpayer sustains an operating loss greater
than his income, the excess is classified as a net operating loss.' This
net operating loss can be applied retroactively as a deduction in the
third year prior to the loss year.'" If the operating loss deduction is
greater than the taxable income in the third year prior to the loss
year, the excess is carried forward until depleted or until the fifth year
following the year of net operating loss is reached."
In Mutual Assurance, the 1969 operating loss was carried back to
1967,12 a year in which Mutual Assurance's tax had been calculated
under the alternative tax provision of § 1201(a) .3 Under the alternative tax provision, capital gain is separated from income and taxed
at a different rate. Since Mutual Assurance's 1969 operating loss
6 See Branda, Net Operating Losses and Capital Gains-Some Bizarre Consequences of the Alternative Tax Computation, 28 TAX LAW. 455 (1975); Nagel, Planning
to avoid Wastage of NOL carryovers: A lesson from Chartier Realty, 42 J. TAXATION
26 (1975); Pratt & Scolnick, The Net OperatingLoss Deduction:DisagreementAmong
Circuit Courts Creates Confusion, 53 TAXES 274 (1975).
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
1 H.R. RP. No. 855, 76 Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1939), reprinted at 1939-2 CUM.
BULL. 510-11. Congress hoped that the existence of the carryover provision would
promote new investment since it granted a deduction for losses which commonly occur
in the first years of a company's operations. Accord, Mutual Assurance Society v.
Commissioner, 505 F.2d at 137; Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. at
357.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(c).
0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(1)(A)(i).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(1)(B).
, The 1969 operating loss was initially carried back to 1966, the third year prior
to the loss year. However, the taxpayer had no taxable income in 1966 so the entire
carryback amount was available in 1967. 505 F.2d at 130.
1SINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201(a). The alternative tax of § 1201(a) is computed
in a two-step process. In the first step, the taxpayer's gross income is reduced by
deductions, including operational loss carryback, and the amount of taxpayer's capital
gain. The resulting figure is the taxpayer's ordinary taxable income and a partial tax
is levied on this amount under Internal Revenue Code § 11. The second step of §
1201(a) assesses a flat 30% tax on the entire amount of the capital gains. The alternative tax of § 1201(a) is mandatory if it assesses a tax lower than that calculated by
the regular methods under §§ 11, 511, 821, 831. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201(a).
For 1967, the year in which the Mutual Assurance controversy arose, the second
step of § 1201(a) assessed only a 25% rate on capital gains. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
1201(a)(1).
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carryback exceeded its 1967 ordinary income,'4 the question contested
was the computation of the excess operating loss carryback available
for use in future years.
The resolution of the issue in Mutual Assurance depended on the
interpretation of a phrase in § 172(b)(2).' 5 That section defines the
amount of operating loss carryback eligible to be carried forward as
the "excess, if any, of the amount of such loss over the sum of the
taxable income for each of the prior taxable years to which such loss
may be carried."'" The Commissioner argued that the words "taxable
income" meant taxable income as defined in § 63(a) 7 which includes
capital gain as well as ordinary income. Conversely, the taxpayer
argued that the phrase meant taxable income to which the operating
loss carryback could actually be applied," that is, only ordinary income. Thus, the essential controversy involved the proper statutory
construction of § 172(b)(2).11
The Fourth Circuit held that, for a taxpayer employing the alternative tax computation, the words "taxable income" in § 172(b)(2)
included capital gain as well as ordinary income. Examining the
statutory language, the court concluded that the phrase "to which
such loss may be carried" in § 172(b)(2) did not modify the crucial
term "taxable income." Instead, the court applied the basic § 63
definition 20 of taxable income to § 172(b)(2). Section 63 defines taxa" The total amount of the 1969 loss was $83,059.04, while the net ordinary income
for 1967 was $72,575.10. The taxpayer contended that the excess of $10,483.94 was
available for a deduction in 1968. 505 F.2d at 129.
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b) provides in pertinent part:
(2) AMOUNT OF CARRYBACKS AND CARRYOVERS. [T]he entire
amount of the net operating loss for any taxable year (hereinafter in
this section referred to as the "loss year") shall be carried to the
earliest of the taxable years to which . . . such loss may be carried.
The portion of such loss which shall be carried to each of the other
taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such loss
over the sum of the taxable income for each of the prior taxable years
to which such loss may be carried.
I6
-d.

z INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 63(a). Taxable income is defined in terms of gross
income, which specifically includes capital gain. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(3).
" If, in an alternative tax computation under Internal Revenue Code § 1201(a),
see note 13 supra, a taxpayer's deductions exceed the amount of his ordinary income
in step one of the computation, the excess is not applied to reduce the amount of
capital gain in step two which is subject to the flat 30% tax. Weil v. Commissioner,
229 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul. 247, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 383. In effect, this excess
of net operating loss carryback over ordinary income has not affected the tax computation.
.. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(2). See note 15 supra.
2 See note 17 supra.
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ble income as gross income, which includes capital gain, minus deductions. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the reference to "taxable income" in § 172(b)(2) was meaningless unless the § 63 definition
was applied.'
Under this construction of the statute, the excess of operating loss
carryback over ordinary income will not automatically be available
as a carryover to future years for a taxpayer employing the alternative
method of tax computation. Instead, operating loss carryback must
exceed not only ordinary income, but capital gain as well. To the
extent that the excess of operating loss carryback over ordinary income is absorbed by the capital gain included in taxable income
2
under § 172(b)(2), it produces no tax benefit for the taxpayer. 1
The Fourth Circuit also relied upon legislative history to support
its holding in MutuaIlAssurance.The court stated that the tax equalization goal of carryback legislation would substantially be achieved
by its decision. 24 Although the taxpayer might not benefit from its
total operating loss carryback, corporations with periodic earnings
would receive tax treatment closer to that of corporations experiencing steady earnings. In reviewing the legislative history,2 the Fourth
21

To support its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit also compared Internal Revenue

Code § 172(b)(2) to Internal Revenue Code § 172(d)(2)(B) which concerns noncorporate taxpayers. The court found that taxable income as used in that section included
capital gain and inferred that Congress would not have intended two concepts of
taxable income to exist in the same code section. 505 F.2d at 129-30.
Nagel, Planning to avoid wastage of NOL carryovers;A lesson from Chartier
Realty, 42 J. TAXATON 26, 28 (1975).
2 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
21 505 F.2d at 137-38.
2 The first carryback provision was introduced in the Revenue Act of 1918. Act
of Feb. 24, 1919, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., Ch. 18, § 204, 40 Stat. 1060. An alternative tax
was enacted in 1921 and modified in 1924. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 232; Act of June 6, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., Ch. 234, §
208(a)(5), 43 Stat. 262. Corporate taxpayers, however, did not receive special treatment for capital gains until 1942. Act of Oct. 21, 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Ch. 619,
§ 150, 56 Stat. 843. Although the combined carryback and alternative tax provisions
operated for a short time to provide tax benefit for each dollar of operational loss which
was depleted, the provisions were abolished in 1933 and 1934 respectively. Act of June
16, 1933, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., Ch. 90, § 218(a), 48 Stat. 209; Act of May 10, 1934, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., Ch. 277, § 117, 48 Stat. 714. The predecessors of the current alternative
tax and carryback provisions were passed in 1938 and 1939 with modifications. Act of
May 28, 1938, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., Ch. 289, § 117(c), 52 Stat. 501; Act of June 29,
1939, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Ch. 247, § 211, 53 Stat. 867. Excess operating loss could
no longer be deducted from capital gain in the carryback year. See note 18 supra.
Whether the excess of operating loss carryback over ordinary income could be absorbed
by capital gain without yielding tax benefit to the taxpayer was also uncertain. 505
F.2d at 136-38.

634

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

Circuit traced the development of both the alternative tax and the
loss carryback tax provisions. The court noted that at one time the
combined carryback and alternative tax provisions had the same
effect as the interpretation argued by the taxpayer in Mutual
Assurance.6 Congress subsequently modified both the carryback and
alternative tax provisions," and failed to require clearly that the full
amount of operating loss carryback always affect the computation of
the alternative tax. The Fourth Circuit inferred that Congress no
longer intended that taxpayers necessarily benefit from each dollar
of operating loss carryback.2 8 Thus, the Fourth Circuit justified its
statutory interpretation as being in substantial compliance with the
legislative goal.
The decision in Mutual Assurance departs from all previous
cases. 9 The Fourth Circuit specifically rejected ChartierReal Estate
Co. v. Commissioner,5 the first case allowing the excess of operating
loss carryback over ordinary income to be deducted in the following
tax year. The Chartiercourt held that the phrase "to which such loss
may be carried" applied not only to "each of the prior taxable years"
but to "taxable income" as well.31 Under the Chartier court's interpretation, a taxpayer using the alternative tax computation would
only apply operating loss carryback to offset ordinary income.12 This
interpretation prevents the excess of operating loss carryback over
ordinary income from being absorbed by capital gain in an alternative tax computation. In rare situations, the Chartierinterpretation
of § 172(b) (2) can cause unfair results to taxpayers,33 but it generally
2 505 F.2d at 138. The court observed that between 1924 and 1934 the excess
operating loss carryback could be used to offset capital gain in the carryback year.
Thus, the taxpayer benefited from his entire operating loss carryback.
See note 25 supra.
505 F.2d at 138.
2 See Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); Olympic Foundry Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 1247
(9th Cir. 1974); Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 346 (1969), aff'd,
428 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1970) (per curiam). See also Data Products v. United States,
74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. § 9759 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd mem., (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 1974),
petitionfor cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3010 (U.S. Feb. 10, 1975) (No. 74-996); Continental
Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 812 (1974); Naegele v. United
States, 383 F. Supp. 1041 (D.Minn. 1973).
20 428 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1970), aff'g (per curiam) 52 T.C. 346 (1969).
31 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172(b)(2). See note 15 supra.
32 See note 18 supra.
See, Lone Manor Farms, Inc., 61 T.C. 48 (1974), aff'd mem., (3d Cir. Jan. 27,
1975). In Lone Manor, the net operating loss carryback for the taxpayer was so great
that the regular method of tax computation was lower in the carryback year and
therefore compulsory. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201(a). See note 13 supra. This switch
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avoids the extreme situation, allowed by Mutual Assurance, in which
capital gain absorbs part of the operating loss carryback deduction
to which the taxpayer is otherwise entitled. Thus, the Chartierreasoning is generally more consistent with the expressed legislative intent 34 than the Mutual Assurance holding because it allows a taxpayer to spread his operating loss further and thus achieve a more
substantial economic parity with the steady income taxpayer.
However, commentators have indicated that both constructions of
§ 172(b) (2) are strained. 5 While the Chartierinterpretation alters the
normal meaning and application of the word "carried", the Mutual
Assurance interpretation draws an analogy to a noncorporate code
section in concluding that the § 63 definition of taxable income is
applicable to § 172(b)(2). Although congressional action to eliminate
the ambiguity of § 172(b) (2) has been urged,3" the Supreme Court has
in the tax computation method resulted in the depletion of taxpayer's operating loss
in the carryback year with minimal tax savings. Had the operating loss carryback been
slightly smaller, the alternative tax computation would still have been employed and
taxpayer would have retained a large operating loss carryback for future use. See,
Nagel, Planningto avoid wastage of NOL carryovers: A lesson from Chartier Realty,

42 J. TAXATION 26, 27 (1975).
" See text accompanying note 8 supra.
" The obvious manipulation involved in reaching the Chartierinterpretation of §
172(b)(2), see text accompanying notes 30-32 supra, has induced some commentators
to accept the Mutual Assurance view as a more literal interpretation. See Nagel,
Planning to avoid wastage of NOL carryovers: A lesson from Chartier Realty, 42 J.
TAXATION 26, 28 (1975); Pratt & Scolnick, The Net Operating Loss Deduction: Disagreement Among Circuit Courts Creates Confusion, 53 TAXEs 274, 278 (1975).
In addition, another circuit court has followed the Mutual Assurance reasoning in
holding against a noncorporate taxpayer on the same issue. Axelrod v. Commissioner,
507 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'g 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 885 (1973). Although mentioning the recent decision in Mutual Assurance, the Axelrod court relied heavily on
Treasury Regulation § 1.172-5 pertaining only to noncorporate taxpayers. 507 F.2d at
888-89. Therefore, the value of the Axelrod decision in support of the Mutual Assurance
holding involving corporations is questionable.
The Mutual Assurance decision has also been criticized for its analysis of §
172(b)(2). See Branda, Net OperatingLosses and CapitalGains-Some Bizarre Consequences of the Alternative Tax Computation, 28 TAX LAW. 455, 464-65 (1975). The
Fourth Circuit relied strongly upon a determination that taxable income for noncorporate taxpayers does not include capital gain. The court reached that conclusion upon
inspection of § 172(b)(2) and § 172 (d)(2)(B). Having made that determination, the
court concluded that the § 63 definition of taxable income must apply to corporate
taxpayers under § 172(b)(2). However, since § 172(d)(2)(B) expressly excludes corporate taxpayers, the value of a comparison with § 172(b)(2) is questionable, and one
commentator has expressed support for the Chartierinterpretation. Branda, Net Operating Losses and Capital Gains-Some Bizarre Consequences of the Alternative Tax
Computation, 28 TAx LAW. 455, 470 (1975).
1, One commentator has called for legislation which would lead to an equitable
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already granted certiorari and heard arguments in a case which relied
upon the Chartierrationale." Hopefully, the Court's forthcoming
opinion will follow the Chartierreasoning. As neither of the statutory
constructions are convincing, the Chartierinterpretation is preferable
since it more nearly coincides with the expressed goal of carryback
legislation. 8
DAVID W. CRANSHAW
result for the taxpayer. Suggestions include allowing operating loss carryback to offset
capital gain and making the alternative tax computation permanent once originally
made. See Nagel, Planningto avoid wastage of NOL Carryovers;A lesson from Chartier Realty, 42 J. TAXATION 26, 29 (1975).
11Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 1003 (1975). Arguments in Foster were heard by the Supreme Court on
November 12, 1975, but at the time of this writing no decision has been announced.
44 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (No. 74-799).
3 See text accompanying note 8 supra.

